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Abstract 
 In this thesis, a lower bound between non-orthogonal coherent states and mean 
photon number in quantum noise randomized stream cipher (Y-00) for a given 
measurement error probability is proposed and compared against other measurement 
schemes. In this analysis, recently discovered maximum likelihood positive operator 
valued measure (ML-POVM) approach in a multiphoton regime is used to provide more 
accurate and optimum results than greedy scheme, quantum unambiguous measurement 
(QUM), and random guessing for which we have considered success probability of 
coherent state detection as a figure of merit. Moreover an analysis about the impact of 
erroneous output sequence of a pseudo random number generator (PRNG) in predicting 
the running seed key is studied. 
 In general, Y-00 scheme utilizes an initial shared secret key between legitimate 
users for which users experience superior receiver performance than does the intruder 
who does not know the key. An intruder suffers unavoidable quantum noise while 
probing the communication between legitimate users, owing to the user’s ignorance of 
the secret key. In particular, an indefinite bound was proposed earlier between the 
number of non-orthogonal coherent states and the mean photon number in Y-00 
scheme. In this research work, a lower bound is proposed using ML-POVM, where ML-
POVM provides better probability of detection of a given number of coherent states and 
mean photon number than other measurement techniques can detect. 
 Finally, a simulation of linear feedback shift register (LFSR) is carried out as an 
example of PRNG for various number of bit-flip errors in the output sequence of LFSR 
to analyze the impact of erroneous output sequence in predicting the running seed key 
xiii 
of LFSR, which demonstrates that a significant number of bit-flip errors is required to 
make the seed key indistinguishable from the observation of the output sequence of 
LFSR.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Today’s world is experiencing ever increasing growth in data volume. Data 
disseminated by computing devices causes a significant amount of information-flow on 
the network. Hence, security in the core network, especially in the datacenter, is of 
prime importance nowadays to prevent cyber-attacks. The eavesdropper always poses a 
potential threat to information security. Moreover, security provided by classical 
cryptographic technologies is bounded by mathematical algorithms and complexities 
and is always challenged by the computational power of computing devices and new 
cryptanalysis techniques. In addition, there is no viable option to track information loss 
between legitimate users. In contrast, quantum cryptography provides security utilizing 
the law of quantum mechanics, therefore, this approach can provide unconditional 
security on the data transferred between legitimate users. 
In a quantum cryptographic approach, signal degradation is directly related to 
information loss for eavesdropper. Quantum cryptography follows Heisenberg’s 
“uncertainty principle” [1] and “no-cloning theorem” [2] both of which ensure data 
integrity, confidentiality, authenticity, and privacy between two legitimate users. So far, 
there are several types of quantum key distribution protocols that have been proposed 
and extensively investigated by implementation. The pioneering quantum cryptographic 
approach, BB-84 protocol [3] suffers in practical implementation, as it utilizes single 
photon or weak coherent states, and due to weak signal strength, this approach is not 
practically realizable in long distance optical fiber communication. In order to 
overcome the problem associated with single photon communication, multiphoton fault-
2 
tolerant approaches are proposed. In Table 1 lists different types of multiphoton 
communication protocols. 
Approach Name Examples 
QKD with multi-photon entangled states Fully device independent QKD, 
measurement device independent QKD 
etc. 
QKD using quantum stream cipher Keyed Communication in Quantum 
Noise (KCQ), ɑ/ƞ scheme 
Continuous-variable protocols Gaussian protocols, discrete-
modulation protocols etc. 
QKD using dynamic quantum session key Braided single stage protocol 
Multiple stage QKD Random polarization based three-stage 
protocol 
Table 1. Multiphoton Quantum Communication Protocol 
 
In this chapter, a brief overview of cryptography is given followed by 
comparative analysis of mathematical and quantum cryptography. Then a generic 
description of quantum key distribution using a single photon approach and a 
multiphoton approach is discussed. Finally, the problem statement and contribution of 
this thesis is presented.  
1.1 Cryptography 
Cryptography is the study of the techniques to exchange data securely between 
legitimate users in the presence of third party, called an eavesdropper [4]. Information 
security such as data integrity, data confidentiality, data authenticity, data non-
repudiation is the main focus of cryptography. Cryptography lies in the intersection of 
the disciplines of mathematics, physics, computer science, and electrical engineering. 
There are a few specific terminologies used in cryptography [5]: 
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Plaintext: information that a sender wants to exchange with a legitimate receiver.  
Cipher text: the encrypted/obscured version of plaintext.  
Key: a variable value or information that is applied to plaintext/cipher text using an 
encryption/decryption algorithm. The secrecy of the key provides the security of the 
cryptographic system. 
Encryption: process of converting plaintext to cipher text. 
Decryption: process of converting cipher text back to plaintext. 
Cryptographic Scheme: a particular process of encryption and decryption. 
Cryptanalysis: techniques used to decrypt cipher text without prior knowledge of 
encryption. 
Cryptology: the study of cryptography and cryptanalysis.  
 In Fig. 1 depicts a typical diagram of cryptographic approach. Generally, 
plaintext is converted into intermediate state or cipher text by the application of the 
encryption algorithm and key. This cipher text is then transmitted to the intended 
receiver. After receiving this cipher text, the legitimate receiver gets the original 
plaintext using the decryption algorithm and key.   
 
Fig. 1. A typical diagram of quantum cryptographic approach 
 
 It is worth mentioning that the strength of a cryptographic scheme depends on 
the strength of the key. There is the Kerckhoff’ principle – “only secrecy of the key 
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provides security.” While developing any cryptographic scheme, it is pre-assumed that 
the eavesdropper knows about the system - the underlying encryption and decryption 
algorithm. The only thing the eavesdropper does not know is the “key.”  
1.2 Mathematical Cryptography 
The cryptographic approach can be divided into many sub-divisions such as 
classical cryptography, modern cryptography, etc. Modern cryptography depicts the rise 
of the computer era. Modern cryptography can be broadly sub-divided into two major 
sections: mathematical and quantum cryptography. The strength or security of the 
mathematical cryptography solely depends on the mathematical complexity of the 
cryptographic algorithm. There are two strong requirements for mathematical 
cryptography: 
1. The encryption algorithm should be   “mathematically strong” to break. Here, 
“mathematically strong” encompasses both space and time complexity of the 
encryption algorithm.  
2. Both legitimate users must obtain the key in a secure fashion. If this key and 
encryption algorithm were known by the eavesdropper, the whole 
communication process can be easily intercepted by the eavesdropper.  
1.2.1 Classification of Mathematical Cryptography 
Mathematical cryptography can be sub-divided into symmetric-key and public-
key, or asymmetric key cryptography. A symmetric-key cryptographic scheme consists 
of plaintext, encryption and decryption algorithm, cipher text and key [5]. In Fig. 2, a 




Fig. 2. A simplified version of symmetric encryption [5] 
 
 The basic criteria of this type of cryptographic scheme is that the same key will 
be shared between sender and receiver. The key is independent of the plaintext, cipher 
text, and cryptographic algorithm such as encryption or decryption scheme. For the 
same plaintext, a different key will generate a different cipher text or a scrambled 
message using the same encryption algorithm. As it is seen in Fig. 2, plaintext is 
converted into cipher text using a shared secret key and encryption algorithm. After 
reception, the cipher text is converted to the original plaintext using the same key and 
decryption algorithm. If the plaintext input is X, encryption key is K, the encryption 
algorithm is E, the cipher text, Y, which can be written as, 
 
𝑌 =  𝐸(𝑋, 𝐾), (1.1)  
The legitimate receiver with the same shared key can retrieve the original 
plaintext from the cipher text using decryption algorithm, D as follows: 
 
𝑋 =  𝐷(𝑌, 𝐾). (1.2)  
The symmetric cipher can be further sub-divided by stream cipher and block 
cipher based on the plaintext processing- stream cipher is one that encrypts plaintext of 
6 
one bit or one byte at a time, and block cipher is one that treats each block of plaintext 
as a whole and generates cipher text of the same length as plaintext. Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 
show the diagram of a stream cipher and a block cipher respectively. 
 
Fig. 3. Stream cipher 
 
 
Fig. 4. Block cipher 
 
On the other hand, public-key or asymmetric cryptography uses two separate but 
related keys for encryption and decryption. The public-key cryptography consists of: 
plaintext, an encryption and decryption algorithm, cipher text, and public and private 
keys. These private and public keys differentiate symmetric and asymmetric key 
cryptography. Actually, there is a pair of keys that have been used in such a way that if 
one key is selected for encryption then the other key will be used for decryption. This 
scheme works as follows: 
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1. Both sender and receiver generates a pair of keys for encryption and 
decryption. 
2. Both sender and receiver places their public key in the public-key repository, 
which can be easily accessible to others while the private key will be kept 
secret. 
3. Now, if the sender wants to send some data to the receiver, the sender will 
encrypt this data with the receiver’s public key. 
4. After reception, the receiver will decrypt this data using its private key. 
A schematic diagram of public-key cryptography is shown in Fig. 5. 
 
Fig. 5. Schematic diagram of public-key cryptography [5] 
 
 For example, sender (Alice) wants to send a message, X, to receiver (Bob). Bob 
has a related pair of keys: public key, PUb, and private key, PRb. PUb is publicly 
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available and, hence, accessible by Alice also, but PRb is available only to Bob. So, the 
form of cipher text, Y, generated by Alice will be  
 
Y = E(PUb , X), (1.3)  
 The legitimate receiver (Bob) then use the private key, PRb, to get back the 
original plaintext as follows: 
 
X = D (PUb, X). (1.4)  
1.3 Quantum Cryptography 
Quantum cryptography exploits the law of quantum mechanics to provide secure 
communication between legitimate users. The first quantum cryptographic protocol was 
proposed by Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard (BB-84) [6]. The main ingredients to 
provide security by quantum cryptography are the following: single photon with a 
particular polarization to represent bit-value; the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, 
which is the impossibility of knowing the state of a single photon along two different 
polarization axes [7]; and the no-cloning theorem, the impossibility of cloning a single 
unknown quantum state [8]. 
 One of the most well-known and advanced applications of quantum 
cryptography is the quantum key distribution (QKD), which provides information-
theoretically-secured exchange of keys between legitimate users. A detailed analysis of 
QKD will be discussed in next section. In a single photon-based QKD approach, it is 
not possible to clone data encoded in an unknown quantum state and any attempt to 
measure unknown quantum state will result in a changes in quantum state which can be 
detected. This is the advantage of quantum cryptography over mathematical 
cryptography. 
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1.3.1 Quantum Bits 
 There is a significant difference between classical and quantum bits. A classical 
bit can take values only between 0 and 1, whereas quantum bits can take any value from 
arbitrary superposition of 0 and 1. In its simplest form, a physical quantum bit or qubit 
can be considered as a two-state system. In Dirac notation, the mapping from a classical 
bit to a quantum bit can be written as follows [9]: 
 
0 →  |0⟩,                    1 →  |1⟩. (1.5)  
According to linearity of quantum theory, the arbitrary superposition of the above two 
states can be written as, 
 𝛼|0⟩  +  𝛽|1⟩, 
(1.6)  
where the coefficients 𝛼 and 𝛽 are called probability amplitudes and satisfies, 
 |𝛼|2 + |𝛽|2 = 1. 
(1.7)  
The vector representation of the states |0⟩ and |1⟩: 









The super-position state of quantum bit in Equation 1.6 can be written as a two-
dimensional vector: 
 |𝜓⟩  ≡   𝛼|0⟩  +  𝛽|1⟩ =  [
 𝛼 
𝛽 ], (1.10) 
1.3.2 Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle 
 Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle is one of the main ingredients for quantum 
key distribution protocol. According to the interference feature of quantum theory, a 
single particle, for example an electron, can exhibit wave-like characteristics, which 
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constitutes wave-particle duality. Each particle has two complementary variables – 
position and momentum. This uncertainty principle states that it is not possible to know 
both its momentum and position simultaneously. Once we measure the position of a 
particle, we will lose all information about its momentum. In quantum key distribution 
protocol, for example in BB84, this uncertainty principle and statistical analysis is used 
to detect the presence of an eavesdropper in a quantum communication channel [10].   
 1.3.3 No-Cloning Theorem  
 The no-cloning theorem is another main ingredient of quantum cryptography. 
Wootters and Zurek proved this theorem [2]. According to this theorem, it is not 
possible to build a device that can clone an arbitrary unknown quantum state. This 
principle demonstrates the significant difference between classical and quantum 
information processing because classical information can be copied easily. Due to this 
principle of quantum communication, it is not possible for any eavesdropper to build 
any universal copier to clone an unknown quantum state [11]. For example, if there is a 
two-qubit unitary operator, which will act as a quantum copier, U and an arbitrary 
quantum state, |𝜓⟩  and an ancillary qubit, |0⟩, according to no-cloning theorem, the 
following relationship never holds: 
 𝑈|𝜓⟩|0⟩ = |𝜓⟩|𝜓⟩, 
(1.11) 
1.3.4 The Photon Polarization 
 As quantum cryptography utilizes laws of quantum mechanics, photon 
polarization is one of the basic concepts in the field of quantum mechanics. In classical 
physics, light is characterized by an electromagnetic wave with an oscillating electric 
field perpendicular to the direction of propagation of the wave, and polarization of light 
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is described by the plane of oscillation of electric field. There are various classification 
of polarization as is shown in Fig. 6. For instance, a linearly polarized light is described 
by a definite plane of oscillation (Fig. 6(a) and Fig. 6(b) show vertically and 
horizontally polarized light). Because of the superposition principle, the sum of a 
horizontal and vertical wave of equal amplitude results in a polarized wave at +45 
degree, if they are in phase or -45 degree if their phase difference is 180 degrees (Fig. 
6(c) and Fig. 6(d)). Similarly, circularly polarized light is obtained when two orthogonal 
linearly polarized lights of equal amplitude are superimposed with a phase difference of 
90 degree or -90 degree (Fig. 6(e) and Fig. 6(f) show right and left circularly polarized 
light). 
 
Fig. 6. Classification of Polarization 
 
 A polarized light can be generated from unpolarized light through transmission, 
reflection, diffraction and scattering [12]. There are different types of optical devices 
are available used to generate polarized light, for example, a polarizer which have 
anisotropic absorbing properties, a beam splitter which splits a light beam into a 
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transmitted and reflected beam.  According to Malus’s law – the intensity of the 
transmitted light, IT, by an optical device is: 
 𝐼𝑇 = 𝐼0 cos
2 𝜃, 
(1.12) 
where, I0 = incident light and 𝜃 = angle between polarization of the incident light and 
the polarization axis of the optical device. 
 In quantum mechanics, this light beam is described by a quantum of energy 
called photon. A polarized light beam is described as a state of photons in which all 
photons have the same polarization, and an unpolarized light beam is one in which the 
polarization of each photon is randomly distributed. In quantum terms, intensity of light 
is described by the number of photons. Now, for example, consider a polarizer with a 
polarization axis, a, and a beam of N0 photons polarized along the axis, b. Then 
according to Malus’s law, a portion of photons (𝑁𝑇 = 𝑁0 cos
2 𝜃𝑎𝑏) is transmitted and 
others are absorbed. As each photon is an indivisible quanta, the probability that a 
photon is transmitted is cos2 𝜃𝑎𝑏. Here, it is worth mentioning that the transmitted 
photon is no longer polarized in b-direction; it is polarized along a-direction, which 
means its initial polarization is changed. This property of photon polarization is used in 
quantum cryptography to detect eavesdropping in the public quantum channel. 
1.4 Quantum Key Distribution 
The most prominent application of quantum cryptography is the quantum key 
distribution (QKD). A QKD approach exploits the law of quantum mechanics to 
provide secure communication of information between legitimate users. The underlying 
principle of quantum mechanics helps the legitimate users to detect the presence of 
eavesdropper. Using this QKD approach, both legitimate parties are able to the share 
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same random secret key, which will be used for symmetric encryption and decryption of 
the message. In Fig. 6, classification of quantum methods for information security is 
shown [13]: 
 
Fig. 7. Classification of quantum methods for information security [13] 
 
1.4.1 Single Photon Approach 
The basic building block of quantum key distribution protocol is based on single 
photon approach which was proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 and hence this 
protocol is named as BB84 protocol [6]. The typical scenario of this QKD protocol is as 
follows: two legitimate parties – Bob and Alice, have access on two channels -private 
14 
quantum channel and public classical channel.  The private quantum channel is used to 
exchange a sequence of single quanta, whereas the public classical channel is used for 
exchanging information. It is worth mentioning that the public classical channel needs 
to be authenticated to avoid man-in-the-middle attack by the eavesdropper. A schematic 
diagram of BB84 protocol is given in Fig. 8. 
 
Fig. 8. A schematic diagram of BB-84 protocol 
 In a typical scenario of BB84 protocol, legitimate users, Alice and Bob, 
establish a secret random binary string, which will be used later as a secret 
cryptographic key. For example, Alice wants to send a sequence of secret strings by 
encoding her bits in a sequence of polarized photons. The coding scheme could be as 
follows: 
0 → |𝑉⟩ 1 → |𝐻⟩ 
0 → |45𝑜⟩ 0 → |−45𝑜⟩ 
Table 2. A typical coding scheme in BB84 protocol 
 
Alice uses two polarization bases randomly – rectilinear basis (+) for (|H⟩, |V⟩) and 
diagonal basis (X) for (|45𝑜⟩, |−45𝑜⟩), to encode her bits in a random manner. These 
polarized photons are then sent through a private quantum channel to Bob. After 
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receiving, Bob will measure these photons. As Bob does not know which basis was 
chosen by Alice, half of the time Bob’s basis choice will be the same as Alice’s basis 
choice. After Bob’s measurement, both Bob and Alice share two random bit strings in 
which there is a 50% probability that bits will be the same in both bit strings. To discard 
mismatched bits, Alice then uses public classical channel to announce her basis choice 
and later on, Bob will announce the instances, where his measurement bases are the 
same as Alice’s measurement bases. Finally, in the absence of Eve, Alice and Bob share 
a secret random bit string, known as a sifted key. A typical scenario in BB84 protocol is 
given in Fig. 9. 
 
Fig. 9. A typical scenario in BB84 protocol 
 
1.4.2 Multi-Photon Approach 
 The pioneering quantum cryptographic approach, BB84 protocol lacks behind in 
the practical implementation aspect, as it utilizes single photon. Due to weak signal 
strength, this approach is difficult to be realized in long distance optical fiber 
communication. In order to overcome the problem associated with single photon 
communication, multiphoton fault-tolerant approaches are proposed. In Table 1, 
different types of multi-photon quantum communication protocol are given. In chapter-
3, a detailed analysis of KCQ (Keyed Communication in Quantum Noise) approach is 
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given. This KCQ approach is also known as Y-00 (Yuen-2000) protocols. The Y-00 
protocol [14] belongs to the family of multiphoton quantum communication protocol. It 
provides physical layer security on data by ensuring quantum uncertainty. Y-00 
protocol enhances the security of classical stream cipher by introducing quantum noise 
effect of uncertainty during the measurement process by any eavesdropper [15]. 
1.5 Problem Statement 
In order to ensure physical-layer security during data communication between 
legitimate users, Y-00 protocol plays an important role as it is a multi-photon approach 
and can be easily integrated into the existing optical fiber technology. As Y-00 uses 
non-orthogonal mesoscopic coherent states, a definite relationship is required between 
coherent states and a mean photon number to restrict the probability of success of 
coherent-state detection of eavesdropper. In this research work, a new multi-photon 
coherent-state measurement technique, ML-POVM, is introduced to provide better 
success probability of coherent-state detection than other measurement techniques such 
as unambiguous measurement, random guessing, greedy scheme, etc. 
  Y-00 utilizes Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) to generate a long-
running key from the initial shared secret key between legitimate users for coherent 
basis selection. Due to unavoidable quantum noise, any eavesdropper, who does not 
know the secret key, experiences measurement error on the output of PRNG, even in the 
case of a known-plaintext attack scenario. As security of this protocol relies on the 
secrecy of the secret key, an impact analysis of the erroneous output (in the form of bit-
flip error) of PRNG is introduced to predict the running seed key of the PRNG by brute 
force attack.  
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1.6 Contribution of the Thesis 
The contributions of the thesis are given below: 
1 Maximum-likelihood-POVM (ML-POVM) technique for multiphoton 
coherent-state detection is introduced in Y-00 protocol, which provides 
better success probability of detection for a given number of non-orthogonal 
coherent states and mean photon number than do other measurement 
techniques such as greedy scheme, unambiguous measurement, random 
guessing etc. 
2 A lower bound between non-orthogonal coherent states and mean photon 
number for a given measurement error probability using ML-POVM is 
given, whereas in previous Y-00 papers, an indefinite bound was proposed. 
3 An impact analysis for erroneous output (in the form of bit flip error) of 
PRNG (Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) is considered as a PRNG) 
due to quantum noise being carried out to quantify the required minimum 
number of bit-flip errors to hide running seed key from eavesdropper’s 
exhaustive search under a known-plaintext attack scenario. 
1.7 Organization of the Thesis 
The thesis is organized as follows: 
 In Chapter 1, an introduction of cryptography is given. It begins with the 
procedure and need for a cryptographic approach for data communication between 
legitimate users. Then classification of a cryptographic approach is introduced, namely - 
mathematical and quantum cryptography. After the discussion on generic classification 
of mathematical cryptography, the working principles of quantum cryptography -
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quantum bits, no-cloning theorem, and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principles, are 
introduced. After that, an introduction of the application of quantum cryptography 
quantum key distribution (QKD), is given. Next, both single-photon and multi-photon-
based cryptographic approaches are discussed. Finally, the problem statement and 
contributions of this research are given. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the basic concepts of information-theoretic security 
analysis. The definitions of entropy, conditional entropy, and mutual information are 
discussed to evaluate the secrecy of any cryptosystem. Several important information-
theoretic quantities are introduced, and, finally, the conditions for perfectly secured 
cryptosystem are given to analyze, compare, and evaluate the performance of any 
practically realizable cryptosystem against an ideal one.  
 Chapter 3 begins with the discussion on keyed communication in quantum noise 
(KCQ) approach. Then, basic working principle of Y-00 protocol and two pioneer 
implementation schemes of Y-00 protocol – phase modulation and intensity or 
amplitude modulation are given. After that, a measurement error analysis of the 
legitimate users and the attacker is given. Finally, a detailed analysis of the overall 
security provided my Y-00 protocol is given. 
 Chapter 4 begins with the poincarѐ sphere representation of the photon 
polarization. Next, a detailed overview of positive operator valued measure (POVM) is 
given. Then, the polarization-based maximum-likelihood-POVM technique in Y-00 
scheme is addressed. After that, a comparative analysis begins by considering the 
success probability of coherent-state detection as a figure of merit between different 
measurement techniques such as ML-PVOM, unambiguous measurement, random 
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guessing, and greedy scheme. Finally, a lower bound is proposed between the number 
of non-orthogonal coherent state and the mean photon number in Y-00 scheme using 
ML-POVM. 
 Chapter 5 focuses on the impact analysis of erroneous output sequences of the 
LFSR on predicting the operating seed key by exhaustive search under known-plaintext 
attack scenario. It begins a discussion of two important attacks – cipher text only attack 
and known plaintext attack. Considering practical implementation perspective, Y-00 
utilizes Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) as a PRNG. The basic working principle 
of the LFSR is discussed next. Then, the bit-flip error analysis for 4-bit, 8-bit and 16-bit 
LFSR is given to measure the required number of bit-flip errors to hide the running seed 
key from the eavesdropper by exhaustive search under known-plaintext attack scenario. 
After that, the same bit-flip error analysis for Non-Linear Feedback Shift Register 
(NLFSR) is given. Finally, success probability of running seed key detection in LFSR 
under a known-plaintext attack scenario is calculated for a given number of non-
orthogonal coherent states and a mean photon number. 







Chapter 2: Information-theoretic Security Analysis 
 The fundamental analysis of cryptographic systems was accomplished by 
Shannon. He published a paper named as “Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems” 
[16] in which he used information theory [17] to characterize cryptosystem by 
introducing entropy, conditional entropy, and mutual information. In his paper, he 
proved the existence of a perfect secrecy system—a system that provides unconditional 
security even though an attacker with unlimited computational power, intercepts the 
system. This type of secrecy is hard to achieve practically in the classical world. For 
example, now a days, the secrecy of most cryptographic systems depend on the 
computational hardness of breaking the algorithm. The main drawbacks of this perfect 
secrecy system to be practically realizable are 1) the length of the key should be equal 
to the length of the plaintext and 2) the key should be used randomly and only once, 
which is a one-time pad. But, in order to carry out a comparative analysis between real 
and perfect cryptosystems, the concept of perfect secrecy is required. 
 This chapter begins with the definition of entropy, conditional entropy and other 
related information-theoretic quantities that are required to define the secrecy of the 
cryptosystem. Next, a mathematical analysis for calculating entropy of deterministic 
algorithm is given, which provides proof that a deterministic algorithm never provides 
additional entropy, rather than initial entropy of the secret random variable. Then, an 
analysis of conditional entropy and mutual information is given to measure average 
information loss on the communication channel. Finally, a detailed discussion of 
perfectly secured systems is given to compare the performance of a practical 
cryptosystem with an ideal one.  
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2.1 Entropy 
According Shannon’s definition, entropy in information theory [17], measures 
the average uncertainty of a statistical random variable. The information content of a 
random variable (x): 
 𝐼(𝑥) =  − log2(𝑝(𝑥)). (2.1)  
 Hence, expected information content of the source: 
 ∑ 𝑃(𝑥)𝐼(𝑥) =  − ∑ 𝑝𝑥(𝑥) log2 (𝑝(𝑥))𝑥 ∈𝑋𝑥 ∈𝑋 = 𝐻(𝑋). (2.2)  
In (2.2), H(X) denotes the entropy of the information source. 
This entropy, H(X), is the minimum rate at which a random variable, X, can be 
compressed and recovered without loss of generality. 
2.1.1 Entropy of a Deterministic Algorithm 
Any deterministic algorithm used, for example, in Pseudo Random Number 
Generator (PRNG), does not increase entropy, as input space is limited by the PRNG, 
and there is no additional boost to increase entropy of the PRNG. Suppose, random 
variable X is n-bit long and each realization (there are m realizations) of random 
variable is equally probable with a probability of  𝑝𝑖 =  
1
2𝑛
= 2−𝑛, the entropy of this 
random variable becomes: 
 𝐻(𝑋) =  − ∑ 𝑝𝑖 log2(𝑝𝑖)
𝑚
𝑖=1 ,  
                            =  − ∑ 2−𝑛 log2 2
−𝑛2𝑛
𝑖=1  =   𝑛. (2.3)  
Now, a PRNG, which used a fixed, deterministic algorithm takes a fixed length input 
and produces random output that is longer as compared to the input. Here, we consider 
the input to the PRNG as a random variable, X, which is n-bit long and output, which is 
also a random variable, Y, which is 2𝑛 bit long, other than that there is no additional 
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bias to the PRNG. If input has 𝑚 = 2𝑛 realizations, output of that PRNG also had 2𝑚 =
22
𝑛
 realizations, as there is no additional bias to the input of the PRNG, we can write, 
the probability of the rest of the realization (22
𝑛
− 2𝑛) is equal to zero. Hence, 
 
                𝐻(𝑌) =  − ∑ 𝑝𝑖 log2(𝑝𝑖)
𝑚
𝑖=1 , 
                           =  − ∑ 2−𝑛 log2(2
−𝑛)2
𝑛




𝑖=1 = 𝑛, 
(2.4) 
So, the upper bound regarding entropy of the output of a PRNG is as follows: 
 𝐻(𝑋) ≥ 𝐻(𝑌). 
(2.5) 
where, H(X) and H(Y) are the entropies of the input and output random variables of the 
PRNG. The criteria for this (2.5) further demonstrates that for the entropy of a random 
variable X, which can take values ranging from 1 to n, the overall entropy is bounded 
by: 
 𝐻(𝑋) ≤ log2 𝑛. (2.6) 
2.2 Conditional Entropy 
Now, consider another random variable, which can take values like 1, 2, 3, m. In 
such a situation, the conditional entropy H (X|Y) is defined as: 
 𝐻(𝑋|𝑌) =  ∑ 𝑝(𝑌 = 𝑗)𝐻(𝑋 |𝑌 = 𝑗)𝑚𝑗=1 . (2.7) 
Equation (2.7) shows that conditional entropy measures the average uncertainty about 
any random variable X, given observations of random variable Y. 
2.2.1 Fano’s Inequality 
 Fano’s inequality in the field of information theory relates conditional entropy 
of a random variable X, given a correlated variable Y, to the probability of incorrectly 
estimating the random variable X given Y [18]. In general, this inequality is used to find 
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a lower bound to show how the probability of incorrectly predicting the value of X 
given Y is bounded by the uncertainty H (X|Y) of X given Y [19]. 
 𝐻2(𝑃𝑒) + 𝑃𝑒 log(|𝑋| − 1) ≥ 𝐻(𝑋|𝑌). (2.8) 
where, 
             𝐻2(𝑃𝑒) = 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
= 𝑃𝑒 log (
1
𝑝𝑒




|X| = set of allowed realization of the input random variable 
𝑃𝑒 = Probability of error of incorrectly estimating of random variable 𝑋 ̂ ≠ 𝑋 
2.3 Mutual Information 
 The mutual information between two random variables X and Y is defined as  





The mutual information between two random variables can be written as 
 𝐼(𝑋; 𝑌) = 𝐻(𝑋) − 𝐻(𝑋|𝑌). 
(2.10) 
Now, if these two random variables are completely independent of each other, there is 
no uncertainty in X given Y, i.e., H (X|Y) = 0. From (2.10) we get, 
 𝐼(𝑋; 𝑌) = 𝐻(𝑋). 
(2.11) 
 Table 2 provides some important information theoretic quantities. Here, 
plaintext = X, cryptographic key = K, observation of legitimate receiver (Bob) = 𝑌𝐵, 















{−𝒍𝒐𝒈𝑷𝒚} Min Entropy, indicates most probable outcome from 
observation and most favorable condition to Eve 
𝑯𝒎𝒂𝒙(𝒀) = 𝒍𝒐𝒈|𝒀| Max Entropy, highest achievable uncertainty from 
observation of the output 
H(K|YE) Secrecy of secret key under cipher-text only attack 
H(X|YE) Secrecy of message under cipher-text only attack 
H (X|YB, K)>0 Error rate of legitimate users, ideally H (X|YB, K) = 0 
H(X|YE) ≤ H(K) Shannon limit in cryptography - perfect secrecy of 
secret key. 
H (Y|X, K) = 0 Non-random cipher 
H (Y|X, K) ≠ 0 Random cipher 
I (X, Y) = 0 Mutual information indicates, statistical independence 
of plaintext and cipher-text, in real scenario,  
I (X, Y) ≤ Ԑ 
H (X, X) = H(X) Entropy of random variable does not change with 
repetition 
H(X|Y) = H (X, Y) - H(Y) Conditional entropy of random variable X, 
conditioned on another random variable Y 
H (X, Y) ≤ H(X) +H(Y) Joint entropy between two random variables 
H (X, Y) ≥ H(X) Additional information increases entropy 
H(X|Y) ≤ H(X) Conditioning reduces entropy 
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D(PX||PU) ≥ 0 Relative entropy between two probability measures 
Table 3. Important information-theoretic quantities 
 
2.4 Perfect Secrecy System 
 A cryptosystem with message X, cipher-text Y, and secret key K is called 
perfectly secure [17], if and only if,  
 𝑃(𝑋|𝑌) = 𝑃(𝑋). 
(2.12) 
which, in turn, is based on the fact that 
1. One-time pad, Length of the message, |X| = Length of Cipher-text, |Y| = Length 
of key, |K |. 
2. Each key should be equally probable, 
1
|𝐾|
 ,  and should be used only once. 
According to (2.12), the posteriori probability of a perfectly secured cryptosystem is 
equal to the priori probability. For a secrecy system, the uncertainty on key, K, given 
cipher text, Y, or the conditional entropy H(K|Y) can be written as [42], 
 𝐻(𝐾|𝑌) = 𝐻(𝑋) + 𝐻(𝐾) − 𝐻(𝑌). 
(2.13) 
In the case of a known-plaintext attack (this topic is discussed further in chapter 5), 
H(X) = H(Y) = 0, so (2.13) further reduces to, 
 𝐻(𝐾|𝑌) =  𝐻(𝐾). 
(2.14) 
The implication of (2.14) is that, for a perfectly secured system, even having the 
knowledge of cipher text, does not reduce the uncertainty of the key. Though 
cryptosystem like one-time pad provides perfect secrecy, this type of approach is hard 
to be practically realizable.  
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2.5 Summary 
 This chapter has introduced various important information-theoretic quantities 
required to analyze and evaluate any cryptosystem. The uncertainty about plaintext, 
cipher text, and key plays an important role in deciding whether a particular 
cryptosystem provides the desired security level. The conditional entropy relates to the 
average information loss from a cryptosystem, whereas mutual information is used to 
identify the channel capacity of a typical communication system between legitimate 
users. In Table 2, some important information theoretic quantities were given. In section 
2.4 a characterization of a perfectly secured system was given based on the concept of 
information theory. This type of characterization helps to evaluate other practically 
realizable cryptosystems against the ideal one. The main disadvantage of a one-time 
pad-based cryptosystem is that the amount of information required to represent a key is 
the same as amount of plaintext to be transmitted over a secure channel. It is worth 
mentioning that, information theory is one of the powerful tools used to evaluate and 





Chapter 3: Keyed Communication in Quantum Noise (KCQ) 
Yuen-2000 (Y-00) is a multiphoton-based quantum cryptographic protocol that 
exploits the advantages of keyed communication in quantum noise (KCQ) [15]. Y-00 
enhances the security of classical information transmittal between legitimate users by 
using quantum detection, estimation, and communication theory. In the BB-84 protocol, 
advantage creation is achieved by using intrusion-level detection, considering the fact 
that it is not possible for the eavesdropper (Eve) to clone or replicate an unknown 
quantum state. But in real-life scenarios, Eve can duplicate a copy similar to the user’s 
observation due to measurement device imperfections of the legitimate users.  
In Y-00, using a pre-shared secret key, the observation of Bob YB, who knows 
the key, will never be the same as the observation of Eve 𝑌𝐸 who does not know the 
key, i.e., 𝑌𝐵  ≠ 𝑌𝐸. Hence security and advantage creation are ensured considering 
optimal quantum receiver performance of the legitimate users. Quantum stream cipher -
based technique like Y-00 can be readily implemented with existing optical fiber 
communications technology. Unlike the single photon state used in BB-84 protocol, 
coherent states used by the Y-00 protocol [20] can be easily generated and measured 
and are also fault-tolerant. 
In this chapter, the basic working principle of Y-00 protocol is given. Then 
different types of implementation schemes of Y-00 protocol are discussed. Next, a 
detailed analysis of optimum quantum receiver performance is presented. After that, the 
effective key generation rate by Y-00 protocol is shown, and, finally, a security analysis 
of Y-00 protocol is given.   
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3.1 Basic Working Principle: Y-00 Protocol 
In 2000, a new quantum cryptographic approach, named the Y-00 protocol was 
proposed by Yuen. It belongs to the class of quantum stream cipher randomized by 
quantum noise from the measurement of coherent states. Fig. 10 depicts a generic 
description of the Y-00 protocol. 
 
Fig. 10. Working principle of Y-00 protocol 
 
Y-00 protocol supersedes the performance of classical cryptography by exploiting the 
quantum effects in optical fiber communication [21]. Moreover, only symmetric key 
encryption supported by quantum key distribution cannot improve the security. In 
classical cryptography, which provides only complexity-based security, the 
observations of Eve and Bob are always the same, i.e., 𝑌𝐵 = 𝑌𝐸.  
 According to information theory, the following inequality of Shannon limit for 
perfect secrecy holds: 
 𝐻(𝑋|𝑌𝐸) ≤ 𝐻(𝐾). (3.1) 
 Equation 3.1 indicates the condition of the one-time pad, which should be 
random, used only once and should be as long as the plaintext. It is not possible for 
classical or conventional cipher to exceed the Shannon limit. However, in Y-00, 
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utilizing the pre-shared key, it is possible to exceed the Shannon limit, thereby 
exploiting the effect of quantum noise, where the necessary condition is 
 𝑌𝐵 ≠ 𝑌𝐸 , (3.2) 
and one of the sufficient conditions is [22]: 
 𝐻 (𝑋|𝑌𝐸 , 𝐾𝑠) > 𝐻(𝑋|𝑌𝐵, 𝐾𝑠) ≅ 0. (3.3) 
Hence, the Y-00 protocol enhances information-theoretic security of classical random 
cipher, using the randomized quantum noise effect of uncertainty. 
3.2 Implementation Scheme 
So far, two methods from other available methods have been exercised to 
implement Y-00 protocol. The first method is phase modulation scheme [23], which 
uses mesoscopic coherent states of significant energy and the other method is amplitude 
modulation scheme [24-28], which uses maximum (𝛼𝑚𝑎𝑥) and minimum (𝛼𝑚𝑖𝑛) 
amplitude of the laser power. In the phase modulation scheme, there are M pairs of 
coherent states with amplitude: 
 𝛼𝑙 = 𝛼0(cosθl + 𝑖 sin 𝜃𝑙), where𝜃𝑙 =
2𝜋𝑙
2𝑀
; 𝑙 = 1,2,3 … 𝑀. (3.4) 
More precisely, M pairs of two coherent states can be written as: |𝛼𝑒𝑖𝜃𝑙⟩ and 
|𝛼𝑒𝑖(𝜃𝑙+𝜋)⟩. A pre-shared seed key is used to run any kind of PRNG (Pseudorandom 
Number Generator) to generate a long-running key, 𝐾𝑅, which has a length of 𝑁 =
2|𝐾𝑠| − 1. The 𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑀 bits of the long running key are used for the selections of a key-
to-phase mapping sequence to modulate each bit of the message by following the 
principle of stream cipher. Thus the instances of long-running keys that are used for the 







The other method is the amplitude modulation scheme, where the maximum 
(𝛼𝑚𝑎𝑥) and minimum (𝛼𝑚𝑖𝑛) amplitudes are fixed and the signal configuration is set to 
|𝛼𝑚𝑎𝑥− 𝛼𝑚𝑖𝑛|
2𝑀
.. For eavesdropper, to get the proper knowledge of the signal set is just 
discrimination of 2M coherent signal-set in the absence of quantum noise. 
 Generally, a mapping pattern is utilized to map the running keys 𝐾𝑅 to the 
parameters that the protocol deals with, such as the amplitude, intensity, or phase. A 




















where, 𝐾𝑅 represents the running key obtained from the output of PRNG, 𝛼 represents 
corresponding basis of encoding/decoding such as |𝛼𝑒𝑖𝜃𝑙⟩ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 |𝛼𝑒𝑖(𝜃𝑙+𝜋)⟩ and X 
represents the corresponding message bit sequences. Fig. 11 depicts the schematic 
diagram of the working principle of Y-00 protocol.  
 
Fig. 11. Working methodology: Y-00 protocol 
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For example, according to the mapping above, the running key-2 is used to select the 
basis number-2 to modulate the message bit-2. The sequences of quantum states after 
the code modulator can be expressed as: 
 |𝜓⟩ = |𝛼𝑖⟩1|𝛼𝑗⟩|𝛼𝑘⟩3 … where 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘 ∈  𝑁 = (1 − 2𝑀). (3.7) 
where |𝛼𝑖⟩ is one of the 2M coherent states. The single mode coherent state can be 
expressed in terms of the superposition of the photon number states |n⟩ [29]  












where |𝛼|2 is the mean photon number of the coherent state. Hence, the probability of 
getting n photon is: 




which is the Poisson distribution. Coherent states are not orthogonal: for any arbitrary 






In order to provide an advantage over the adversary, the legitimate users need to choose 




Now, if Eve utilizes heterodyne measurement on her intercepted sequences, Eve’s 
probability of error becomes [30]: 












= 0.2 ~ 0.5. 
(3.12) 
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where, for phase modulation scheme, 𝑡0 =
𝜋|𝛼|
2𝑀




. Equation (3.12) represents probability of error between two 
neighboring states and provides the degree of quantum nose effect due to the number of 
coherent states, M, and quadrature amplitude, 𝛼. 
3.2.1 ISK-Y-00- An Intensity-based Modulation Implementation Scheme 
 In Fig. 12, multi-level intensity-based modulation scheme for Y-00 protocol is 
shown which has been implemented in [31]. In transmitting side, a long running-key 
sequence is used for actual message sequence encryption generated by PRNG.  The 
seed key of PRNG has been shared between transmitter and receiver prior to the 
communication. The appropriate value for coherent basis selection is controlled by the 
value of the long-running key. After that, based on basis value, value of intensity level 
of the signal is determined. Finally, input data is modulated by the code modulator to a 
multi-level intensity-based signal. Then, after converting it into a coherent quantum 
signal, the sender’s message is transmitted to the optical line as a Y-00-encrypted 
signal. 
 
Fig. 12. A practical implementation scheme of Y-00 protocol 
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 In the receiving side, a coherent quantum signal is converted into an electrical 
signal. Because the same seed key is used in both the transmitting and the receiving 
side, information about a coherent basis selection would be the same and properly 
synchronized with the transmitter. A threshold value detection is used to appropriately 
recover the received signal. And finally, the code demodulator is used to subsequently 
retrieve the original message bit sequence based on the information of the threshold 
value detection. 
3.3 An Optical Quantum Receiver Performance 
The legitimate receiver (Bob) uses a binary optimum quantum receiver together 
with the pre-shared secret key. At the beginning of the protocol, both sender and 
receiver should know the necessary system’s working parameters [32, 33] in order to 
prepare and measure the coherent quantum state. Ideally, the output of the measurement 
for the legitimate users is: 
 𝐻(𝑋|𝑌𝐵, 𝐾𝑠) = 0. (3.13) 
A binary communication system transmits information during every T seconds by one 
of the two coherent states: |𝛼0⟩ and |𝛼1⟩ that occurs with relative probabilities 𝑃0 and 𝑃1, 
respectively. The minimum average probability of errors experiencing by any binary 
receiver to identify the appropriate coherent state between the two coherent signals is 









where |𝛼1 − 𝛼0|
2 = 𝑆 is the square of the amplitude difference of the two coherent 
signals. 
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An adversary who does not know the key, must use a universal heterodyne 
receiver; and according to quantum detection and estimation theory, there is a benefit in 
the measurement process which implies 
 𝑃𝑒(ℎ𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟) ≥ 𝑃𝑒(𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟). (3.15) 
 For M measurement basis states and for equally probable signal, the minimum 








where 𝐾𝑠 is the length of the seed key. Fig. 13 shows an optimum quantum receiver 
performance for different coherent signal sets using (3.16). 
 
Fig. 13. Quantum optimum receiver performance for basis state number M 
 
 Overall, for heterodyne measurement and optimum quantum receiver 










3.4 Effective Key Generation Rate 
The condition for net key generation rate in Y-00 protocol can be written as, 
 |𝐾|𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 <  ∆𝐼 ≡ 𝐼(𝑋, 𝑌𝐵) − 𝐼(𝑋, 𝑌𝐸),. (3.18) 
where I(X,Y) is the mutual information between the two random variables X and Y. A 
detailed analysis of mutual information is given in chapter 2. The effective key 
generation for the Y-00 protocol is [14]: 
 𝐾𝑒𝑓𝑓 = |𝐾|𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 − 𝐼𝐸 − |𝐾𝑣| − |𝐾𝑚|,. (3.19) 
where 𝐼𝐸 is the side information of Eve on the final key which needs to be controlled to 
ensure secrecy on the generated key 𝐾𝑒𝑓𝑓, 𝐾𝑣 is the verification key, and |𝐾𝑚| is the 
modulation key. 
3.5 Security Analysis: Y-00 
 According to [35], “A QKD protocol is defined as secure if, for any security 
parameters s >0 and l > 0 chosen by Alice and Bob, and for any eavesdropping 
strategy, either the scheme aborts, or it succeeds with probability at least 𝑂(1 − 2−𝑠), 
and guarantees that Eve’s mutual information with the final key is less than 2−𝑙. The 
key string must also be essentially random.” 
Though security is an abstract concept, we can identify that a given 
communication system is secure, but it is not possible to measure the level of security 
with perfection. Several security criteria have been defined so far [36 - 40]: 
Correctness: The observation of output for Alice and Bob should be identical, 
i.e., 𝑌𝐴 = 𝑌𝐵. 
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Forward and Backward Secrecy: Forward secrecy means an attacker should not 
be able to predict the past output of the protocol based on the side information of the 
protocol. Backward secrecy indicates that it is not possible for the adversary to predict 
the future output of the protocol even if some observation of the output is compromised. 
Resilience: The protocol should be resilient in the sense that even if the initial 
input (entropy source) of the protocol is compromised or influenced by the attackers, it 
is not possible for the attacker to predict the future output of the protocol. 
Robustness: If a protocol exhibits the afore-stated characteristics such as 
correctness, forward and backward secrecy, and, resilience, then it remains robust under 
adverse conditions. In a robust condition, observation of Alice and Bob would be the 
same assuming no-loss in measurement device. 
In a real-world scenario, there are imperfections in measurement devices, and 
for that reason ideal and real devices exhibit different characteristics under the same 
working conditions. Typically, a relaxation criterion is deployed so that real protocol 
does not show correctness, robustness, and secrecy like an ideal protocol. According to 
[36], “A QKD protocol Ƥreal is ϵ-secure if it is ϵ-indistinguishable from a (hypothetical) 
protocol Ƥideal which is perfectly secure, i.e. Ƥideal satisfies the correctness, the secrecy 
and the robustness criteria.”    
The security of the seed key for Y-00 protocol is defined as [22]: 
 𝑄 = 𝑀 
|𝐾𝑠|
log2 𝑀 = 2|𝐾𝑠|.. (3.20) 
where |KS| is the length of secret key, M is the number of coherent basis used for 
modulating the message bit. The secrecy of Y-00 protocol is entirely depends on the 
seed key of the PRNG. It is assumed that the entropy of the input to the PRNG is: 
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 𝐻(𝐾𝑠) = |𝐾𝑠|.. (3.21) 
 According to the basic principle of Y-00, even if Eve uses most powerful 
receiver, she will eventually suffer error while measuring her intercepted data. The 














Now, considering this masking effect, (3.20) can be written as, 
 𝑄 = 𝛤 
|𝐾𝑠|
log2 𝑀.. (3.23) 
When number of coherent states, M ≫ quadrature amplitude, |𝛼|, then 𝛤 = M and 
equation (3.23) converges to (3.20). 
Generally, the computational complexity/security of a typical PRNG can be written as: 
 𝑄 = 2𝜂|𝐾𝑠|.. 
(3.24) 
where 𝜂 is a constant and is equal to 1 when there is no quantum noise. But due to 
masking effect of quantum noise this constant 𝜂 > 1 and hence increase the burden of 
the attacker to get the correct operational secret key. That’s why Y-00 protocol is called 
quantum noise randomized stream cipher which provides additional layer of complexity 
in the underlying PRNG. 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter has introduced the basic working principle of the multi-photon 
quantum noise randomized stream cipher - Y-00 protocol. Of other implementation 
schemes, two prominent implementation schemes - phase modulation and intensity or 
amplitude modulation are discussed. Next, the masking effect due to quantum noise in 
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Y-00 protocol is discussed. The legitimate users have certain advantages over attackers 
due to the knowledge of the secret key. To achieve this advantage, the number of 
coherent states should be much higher than the mean photon number. Then, the 
probability of error of coherent state detection is calculated for both Alice and Bob, who 
knows the secret key, and for Eve, who does not know the secret key. After that, an 
effective key generation rate by Y-00 protocol is given using the concept of mutual 
information. Finally, a practical security analysis of Y-00 protocol is given to show how 




 Chapter 4: Success Probability of Coherent State Detection Analysis 
in Y- 00 using Maximum Likelihood-POVM 
This chapter introduces a new measurement technique based on maximum 
likelihood estimation for correct detection of a coherent state in a Y-00 scheme. In 
general, there are many measurement techniques that are applicable in Y-00 scheme. 
Out of which phase modulation is used for measuring the performance of Y-00 protocol 
theoretically and intensity modulation is used for practical implementation purpose. 
This chapter introduced a new measurement technique using polarization on the surface 
of 2D-Poincarѐ sphere. This maximum likelihood-POVM that belongs to the family of 
ambiguous measurement gives better success probability of coherent state detection 
than other measurement techniques such as unambiguous measurement, random 
guessing, greedy scheme, etc. for a given number of non-orthogonal coherent states and 
mean photon number. Moreover, a lower bound is proposed using the ML-POVM 
measurement technique between mean number of photons and number of non-
orthogonal coherent states for a given success probability, whereas in earlier papers on 
Y-00 protocol, an indefinite bound was proposed.  
 This chapter begins with the Poincarѐ representation of photon polarization. 
Then POVM measurement technique for polarization-based coherent state detection is 
discussed. Next, the theory and concept behind the maximum-likelihood POVM 
measurement technique for photon polarization detection is discussed. After that, a 
comparative analysis on success probability of coherent state detection using ML-
POVM, greedy scheme, random guessing, and unambiguous measurement is presented. 
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Finally, a lower bound between mean photon number and the number of non-orthogonal 
coherent states using ML-POVM is calculated. 
4.1 Poincarѐ Sphere Representation of Photon Polarization 
As discussed in chapter 1, polarization is one of the properties of light that 
describes the orientation of oscillation of electromagnetic waves. In quantum 
mechanics, this light is described as a massless quanta or number of photons instead of 
electromagnetic wave. The Poincarѐ sphere is an excellent tool to represent all different 
types of polarization – horizontal, vertical, elliptical, diagonal, anti-diagonal, etc. on 
3D-speherical co-ordinates. A typical representation of Poincarѐ sphere for polarization 
of light [43 - 44] is given in Fig. 14. 
 
Fig. 14. Poincarѐ sphere representation of polarization 
 
 A Poincarѐ sphere is represented in the form of spherical co-ordinates 
(𝐼, 𝑝, 2𝜓, 2𝜒) with each point on the sphere representing a pure state of polarization, 
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whereas the north-pole and south-pole represent right-circular (R) and left-circular (L), 
polarization respectively. Points along the equator on the sphere represents linear 
polarization-horizontal (H), vertical (V), diagonal (D), anti-diagonal (A). Points in the 
southern hemisphere represent left-handed and points in the northern hemisphere 
represent right-handed ellipses. The parameters 2𝜓 and 2𝜒 represent polar and azimuth 
angles, respectively. The parameter, I, represents the identity of the photon, or the 
electromagnetic wave, whereas p denotes the degree of polarization. Values of p vary 
between 0 and 1. If p = 1, then polarization is represented on the surface of the sphere 
with radius I if p = 0, then there is no polarization, and if 0 < p < 1, polarization is 
represented as being inside the sphere. So, any polarization on the Poincarѐ sphere can 
be uniquely identified by these four parameters 𝐼, 𝑝, 2𝜓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 2𝜒 
4.2 Positive Operator Valued Measure (POVM) 
In quantum information and measurement theory [9, 45-46], a Positive-Operator 
Valued Measure (POVM) is a measure that gives non-negative operators {𝑀𝑗}𝑗  on 
infinite-dimensional Hilbert space, and integrals of all operators give the identity 
operator, ∑ 𝑀𝑗𝑗 = 𝐼. Generally, a density operator is used to describe a quantum state. 
In case of finite-dimensional state-space, the general form of density operator is: 
 𝜌 =  ∑ 𝑝𝑗  |𝜓⟩𝑗 ⟨𝜓|.. (4.1) 
 According to the definition of POVM, which works on a quantum state can be 
describes by density operator 𝜌 and the trace becomes: 
 𝑇𝑟(𝑀𝑗𝜌) ≥ 0.. (4.2) 
Moreover, a set of measurement operators, {𝑀𝑗}𝑗  satisfies a completeness condition: 
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 ∑ 𝑀𝑗
†𝑀𝑗𝑗 = 𝐼.. (4.3) 
In case of pure state, 𝜌 = |𝜓⟩⟨𝜓|  the probability becomes, 
 𝑝𝑗(𝑗) =  ⟨𝜓|𝑀𝑗
†𝑀𝑗| 𝜓⟩ = ||𝑀𝑗|𝜓⟩||
2    .. 
(4.4) 
and for ensemble of states,  
 𝑝𝑗(𝑗) =  𝑇𝑟{𝑀𝑗
†𝑀𝑗𝜌} =   𝑇𝑟{𝑀𝑗
†𝜌𝑀𝑗}  .. (4.5) 









 In general, POVM measurement on a particular quantum system is performed, 
when there is no need to care about the post-measurement state. The only important 
thing to care about, is the probability of obtaining a particular outcome, for instance, the 
transmission of classical data over a quantum channel where the intended receiver does 
not care about the post-measurement state.    
4.3 Maximum-Likelihood Positive Operator Valued Measure (ML-POVM) 
The idea behind maximum-likelihood positive operator-valued measure in a 
multiphoton regime was proposed in paper [47]. In this paper, both success probability 
and mean fidelity are considered when evaluating the performance of this measurement 
technique with respect to other measurement technique such as the greedy scheme. 
Before discussing on measuring criteria of maximum-likelihood POVM, it is helpful to 
understand a few basic concepts of quantum measurement and information theory. 
4.3.1 Trace Distance 
According to the definition of trace distance, the trace distance between two 
operators A and B is given by,  
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 ||𝐴 − 𝐵||
1
= 𝑇𝑟{√(𝐴 − 𝐵)†(𝐴 − 𝐵)}.. 
(4.7) 
In quantum mechanics, trace distance is a measure of indistinguishability between two 
quantum states. For two density operators 𝜌 and 𝜎, the bound for trace distance is 
represented as 




From (4.8), it is clear that two quantum states are equal if and only if the trace distance 
between the two states is zero. According to quantum hypothesis testing, trace distance 







 ‖ 𝜌 − 𝜎‖1].. (4.9) 
4.3.2 Fidelity 
In quantum information theory, fidelity is a measure of closeness of two 
quantum states. The fidelity of two density matrices 𝜌 and 𝜎 is 
 𝐹(𝜌, 𝜎) = 𝑇𝑟 {√√𝜌𝜎√𝜌}
2
  .. (4.10) 
The fidelity for two pure states |𝜓⟩ and |𝜙⟩ is defined as: 
 𝐹(|𝜓⟩, |𝜙⟩) =  |⟨𝜓|𝜙⟩|2  .. 
(4.11) 
and fidelity satisfies the following bound: 
 0 ≤ 𝐹(|𝜓⟩, |𝜙⟩) ≤  1  .. 
(4.12) 
The relationship between trace distance and fidelity for two quantum states 𝜌 and 𝜎 is 
given by 
 1 − √𝐹(𝜌, 𝜎) ≤
1
2
 ‖𝜌 − 𝜎‖1 ≤ √1 − 𝐹(𝜌, 𝜎)  . (4.13) 
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4.3.3 Maximum-Likelihood Estimation 
 In statistical analysis, maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) is a method of 
estimating a statistical model’s parameter, given observed data that maximizes the 
likelihood of generating the observed data. 
The likelihood function is calculated using the joint density function for an independent 
and identically distributed sample: 
 𝑓(𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛| 𝜃) = 𝑓(𝑥1|𝜃) × 𝑓(𝑥2|𝜃) … × 𝑓(𝑥𝑛|𝜃). (4.14) 
In case of likelihood estimation, the observed values 𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛 have to be fixed 
parameters, and 𝜃 will be the function’s variable which can vary: 
 𝐿(𝜃; 𝑥1, 𝑥2, … . , 𝑥𝑛) = 𝑓(𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛|𝜃) =  ∏ 𝑓(𝑥𝑖|𝜃)
𝑛
𝑖=1 . (4.15) 
The maximum likelihood method estimates 𝜃0 by finding the value of 𝜃 that maximizes 
above function: 
 𝜃0(𝑀𝐿𝐸) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝛳 ∈ 𝛩𝑓(𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛|𝜃). (4.16) 
4.3.4 Maximum-Likelihood POVM in Multiphoton Regime 
 There are various implementation schemes for Y-00 protocol such as PSK-Y-00 
(phase modulation), ISK-Y-00 (intensity/amplitude modulation) etc. In this analysis, we 
are considering phase randomized polarization based implementation for calculating 
success probability and mean fidelity in a case of given mean number of photon and 
number of non-orthogonal coherent states. As discussed in section 4.1, a Bloch sphere is 
used to represent polarization of qubit, which can be determined uniquely by 𝜃 and 𝜙. 




















In general, a coherent state can be represented as a superposition of Fock state with 
definite photon statistics. Instead, in this analysis, photon statistics are specified by the 
photon number distribution, 𝑃𝑛, and quantum state, which can be represented as, 
 𝜌(𝒓) =  ∑ 𝑃𝑛|𝑛⟩𝒓⟨𝑛|
∞
𝑛=0 . (4.19) 
where r is uniquely identified by 𝜃 and 𝜙. Now, according to the maximum-likelihood 
estimation, for a given polarization r, the maximum likelihood estimation of initial 
unknown polarization, 𝒓𝒐, is   
 𝒓0(𝑀𝐿𝐸) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝒓∈𝑆 𝑃(𝒓|𝒓𝟎) = 𝒓. (4.20) 
where 𝑃(𝒓|𝒓𝟎) is the maximum likelihood estimation function using ML-POVM, 
 𝑃(𝒓|𝒓𝟎) = 𝑇𝑟[𝛱(𝒓)𝜌(𝒓0)]. (4.21) 
Here, 𝜌(𝒓0) is calculated using (4.19), and 𝛱(𝒓) is calculated using quantum estimation 
and detection theory [34]. The maximum-likelihood POVM 𝛱(𝒓) satisfies the 
following conditions: 
 [ϒ − 𝑊(𝒓)]𝛱(𝒓) =  𝛱(𝒓)[ϒ − 𝑊(𝒓)] = 0, 
(4.22) 
and  
 ϒ − 𝑊(𝒓) ≥ 0. 
(4.23) 
where 𝑊(𝒓) is the Hermitian risk operator, and ϒ is a Hermitian Lagrange operator. 
After calculating the integration over the Bloch surface, S, the ML-POVM, 𝛱(𝒓), which 
satisfies (4.22) and (4.23): 





𝑛=0 . (4.24) 
Now, putting the value of (4.19) and (4.24) into (4.21), we get  
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 (1 + 𝒓. 𝒓𝟎) is the mean fidelity between polarizations r and 𝒓𝟎.  
Consider a finite region 𝑆𝜖(𝑟0) on the Bloch sphere as a circle around 
polarization 𝑟0 where 2𝜖 is an angular diameter, and the value of 𝜖 ranges from 0 to 𝜋 as 
shown in Fig. 15. The success probability can be calculated as 




Fig. 15. Finite region of circle around polarization on Bloch sphere 
 
Now from (4.25) and (4.26) we get, 
 






𝑛=0 . (4.27) 









So, the success probability using Poisson distribution becomes, 
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(|𝛼|2+1) . (4.29) 
Equation 4.29 represents the success probability of coherent state detection of mean 
photon number |𝛼|2 considering Poisson distribution and two neighboring qubits are 𝜖-
angular distance away from each other on the Bloch sphere. 
4.4 Success Probability of Coherent State Detection using ML-POVM in Y-
00 Protocol 
In this section, success probability of non-orthogonal coherent state detection is 
calculated for a given number of coherent states and mean photon using ML-POVM. 
Now, if we consider a two-dimensional realization of Bloch sphere for representing M 






So using (4.29), success probability for non-orthogonal coherent state, M and mean 
photon number, |𝛼|2 becomes, 
 






Now using (4.31), success probability of correctly identifying non-orthogonal coherent 
state for a different number of coherent states (M = 1000, 2000, 3000) and mean photon 
number (|𝛼|2 = 0-10000) has been calculated and shown in Fig. 16. From Fig. 16, it is 
worth mentioning that using the ML-POVM measurement technique to limit the 
eavesdropper performance in Y-00 scheme who does not know the secret key, the 
number of coherent state M needs to be greater than mean photon number |𝛼|2. 
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Fig. 16. Probability of detection vs mean photon number using ML-POVM 
 
4.4.1 Comparative Analysis of Success Probability of Coherent State Detection between 
Ambiguous and Unambiguous Measurement 
In principle, there are two ways to discriminate between non-orthogonal 
coherent states: ambiguous measurement, which gives erroneous result, and 
unambiguous measurement, which gives inconclusive result. For example, the Helstrom 
measurement strategy [34] belongs to the class of ambiguous measurement, which is 
optimum measurement strategy and provides minimum probability of error while 
discriminating between two non-orthogonal states.  
The unambiguous measurement strategy has zero measurement error at the 
expenses of providing inconclusive result. The success probability using quantum 
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unambiguous measurement (QUM) for M symmetric coherent states is given by Chefles 
and Barnett [49]: 





















If the non-orthogonal coherent states are of equal prior probabilities, the probability of 
providing inconclusive resultd is provided by Ivanovic-Peres limit [50, 51] 
 𝑃𝐼𝑃 = |⟨𝜓0|𝜓1⟩|. (4.33) 
According to [49], the optimal inconclusive probability, 𝑃𝑒(𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑜𝑢𝑠) of 
unambiguous measurement is always greater than or equal to minimum-error 
probability of ambiguous measurement 𝑃𝑒(𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑜𝑢𝑠) and hence 
 𝑃𝑒(𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑜𝑢𝑠) ≥ 𝑃𝑒(𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑜𝑢𝑠). (4.34) 
This is due to the fact that unambiguous measurement strategy is less likely to succeed 
because it eliminates any accidental probability of failure as well as it compromises any 
accidental probability of success. Whereas random guessing, which signifies “no-
measurement” at all, belongs to the family of ambiguous measurement. It can provide 
wrong measurement outcome without notifying that it failed. In case of equal-probable 
independent events, random guessing, therefore, provides free boost of 1/n probability, 
which is simply a guess and very likely to be a wrong. Hence, in case of a large number 
of measurement bases, success probability of random guess (unambiguous 
measurement) for discriminating non-orthogonal coherent states is much higher than the 
success probability of unambiguous quantum state discrimination. In Table 4 a 
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comparative analysis of success probability calculation using unambiguous 
measurement, random guessing, and ML-PVOM is given for various number of 
coherent states and mean photon number. From Table 4, it is clear that ML-POVM 
measurement provides better probability of success for non-orthogonal coherent state 
detection than do the other two measurement techniques for a given number of non-














10000 2000 3 × 10−12  5 × 10−4 0.6 
1000 2000 2.1565 × 10−13 5 × 10−4 0.39 
4000 1500 1.6510 × 10−13 6.67 × 10−4 0.31 
Table 4. Success probability of coherent state detection using different 
measurement strategies 
 
4.4.2 Comparative Analysis of Success Probability of Coherent State Detection between 
Greedy Scheme and ML-POVM 
 A greedy scheme [52] is an adaptive local measurement with classical 
communication to maximize average fidelity at each measurement step. It provides 
better results in comparison to other measurement techniques such as stokes parameters 
measurement. It uses classical communication because this measurement scheme takes 
into consideration - the result of the previous measurement step. The likelihood function 
for 2D-greedy scheme after n-measurement step: 




𝑘=1 =  ∏ |𝑓𝒎𝒌𝒓0|
2𝑛
𝑘=1 . (4.35) 
51 
Here, 𝒎𝑘 is the 𝑘
𝑡ℎ measurement basis where 𝑘 ≥ 2, which is calculated by 
maximizing the average fidelity of the 𝑘𝑡ℎ measurement step using the result of 
(𝑘 − 1)𝑡ℎ measurement step and χn is the measurement outcome at n steps. 








𝑽(χn) =  ∫ P(χn|𝐫0)𝑝(𝒓0)𝒓0𝑑𝒓0 
In Fig. 17 shows the success probability of coherent state detection for given number of 
coherent states (M = 1000) and mean photon number (|𝛼|2 = 45) using greedy scheme 
(dotted line) and ML-POVM (solid line) is shown. From Fig. 17, it is clear that ML-
POVM measurement strategy gives better results in terms of success probability of 
coherent detection due to collective measurement of all photons in one step. 
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Fig. 17. Probability of detection for given number of coherent states and mean 
photon number using greedy scheme (dotted line) and ML-POVM (solid line) 
 
4.5 A Lower Bound between Mean Photon Number and Number of 
Coherent State Using ML-POVM 
In [14], an indefinite bound between numbers of non-orthogonal coherent states 
and mean photon number is given as: 
Number of non-orthogonal coherent state (M) ≫ Mean photon number (|𝛼|2) 
But using the ML-POVM measurement technique, a lower bound between the number 
of non-orthogonal coherent states and mean photon number is calculated for a given 
probability of measurement error. Using (4.31) we get, 





where, probability of error, 𝑃𝑒 = 1 – success probability (𝑄𝑝𝑜𝑖) 
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Table 5 shows the lower bound between number of coherent state and mean photon 
number using (4.37) for a given measurement error probability. 
Probability of measurement error  
Lower bound between number of coherent 
state and mean photon number  
0.4 𝑀 ≥ 1.092|𝛼|2 
0.5 𝑀 ≥ 1.44|𝛼|2 
0.6 𝑀 ≥ 1.96|𝛼|2 
Table 5. Lower bound between number of coherent states and mean photon 
number for given probability of error using ML-POVM 
 
4.6 Conditional Entropy Calculation of Running Key of PRNG in Y-00 
In Y-00 protocol, an eavesdropper measures the output of the PRNG without 
having any prior knowledge on seed key. Due to lack of knowledge on seed key, Eve 
always introduces error while measuring the output of the PRNG. Fano’s inequality as 
described in section 2.2.1 plays an important role to measure the average uncertainty on 
running key sequence given the Eve’s observation (𝑌𝐸), which can be written as, 
 𝐻2(𝑃𝑒) + 𝑃𝑒 log(2
|𝐾𝑠| − 1)  =  𝐻(𝐾𝑅|𝑌𝐸).. (4.38) 











1000 50 0.95 95.07 
1000 100 0.9 90.15 
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1000 1000 0.37 38.43 
1000 2000 0.14 16.84 
2000 2000 0.37 38.43 
3000 2000 0.51 51.97 
**In this calculation, seed key length is considered as 100 bit, which is independently 
and identically distributed random variable and period of PRNG is 2100 − 1  
Table 6. Conditional entropy calculation of running key of PRNG using Fano's 
inequality and ML-POVM 
 
4.7 Summary 
In this chapter, a Poincarѐ representation of photon polarization is introduced. 
Next, a pioneer photon polarization measurement technique is discussed, namely 
Positive Operator Valued Measure (POVM). Then, we introduced recently formulated 
maximum-likelihood POVM (ML-POVM) in multiphoton regime. We have compared 
the success probability of coherent state detection for a given number of coherent states 
and mean photon numbers, using different polarization measurement techniques such as 
greedy scheme, unambiguous measurement, ML-POVM, etc. in the Y-00 scheme. From 
the comparative analysis of measurement techniques where success probability is 
considered as a figure of merit, we have proved that ML-POVM shows better success 
probability of coherent state detection for a given number of coherent states and mean 
photon numbers. After that a lower bound is proposed between the number of non-
orthogonal coherent states and mean photon numbers, using ML-POVM. Finally, using 
Fano’s inequality, conditional entropy of the long-running key (𝐾𝑅) of PRNG is 
calculated based on the arbitrary intercepted observation (𝑌𝐸) of eavesdropper. 
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Chapter 5: Impact Analysis of Measurement Error in Pseudo-Random 
Number Generator (PRNG) 
 In Y-00 protocol, the use of Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG), is to 
generate a long-running key sequence from the short secret key. The key-bit sequences 
from a long-running key are used for appropriate coherent basis selection to modulate 
plaint-text sequence according to a mapping table. Eve always introduces error in Y-00 
protocol while measuring the output of PRNG due to her lack of knowledge of the seed 
key. This measurement error is due to the quantum uncertainty. The overall security of 
Y-00 protocol lies in the secrecy of the seed key. Eve’s main task is to predict the seed 
key based on her observation of the long-running key. From an implementation 
perspective, Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) is generally used as a PRNG in Y-
00 protocol. The measurement error in the output of PRNG plays an important role in 
predicting the seed key.  
 This chapter begins with a brief introduction on the different types of 
cryptographic attacks. In particular, the importance of considering known-plaintext 
attack on multiphoton-based approach is discussed. The next section begins with the 
working principle of the LFSR, the impact of feedback polynomial, and the number of 
tapings required to generate maximum length (2𝑛 − 1, n = number of bits in the input 
sequence) output sequence of the LFSR. For analyzing the impact of error in the output 
sequence of LFSR, we have considered a typical scenario of bit-flip error. We have 
simulated different implementation of LFSR such as 4-bit, 8-bit, and 16-bit LFSR. Then 
we have introduced random bit flip-error into the output sequence of the PRNG to 
analyze the impact of error for predicting the seed key. It has been shown that a 
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significant number of bit-flip error is required to make the seed key unpredictable from 
the erroneous observation of the output sequence of the PRNG by brute-force attack. 
Moreover, the configuration or set-up of the LFSR is also important for analyzing the 
impact of bit-flip error in the output sequence on the prediction of the seed key. Finally, 
a similar bit-flip error analysis was conducted on non-LFSR to evaluate the correlation 
between the input and output sequence. 
5.1 Attacks on Cryptosystem 
An eavesdropper always poses a potential threat to the cryptosystem. Typically, 
the main objective of a cryptographic attack is to retrieve the key, rather than the 
plaintext, from the cipher text. Cryptanalytic attacks exploit the characteristics of the 
algorithm with some knowledge of the plaintext or sample plaintext-cipher text pair. 
Based on the nature of attacks on the cryptosystem, the cryptographic attacks can be 
categorized as cipher text only attack, known plaintext attack, chosen plaintext attack, 
man-in-the-middle attack, birthday attack, timing attack, side channel attack, correlation 
attack, power analysis attack, etc. Table 7 shows characteristics of different types of 
attacks on the encrypted message [5]. 
Type of attack Known to attacker 
Cipher text only  Cipher text 
 Encryption algorithm 
Known Plaintext  Encryption algorithm 
 One or more plaintext-cipher text 
pairs 
Chosen Plaintext  Encryption algorithm 
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 Plaintext chosen by attacker 
together with corresponding cipher 
text generated by secret key 
Chosen Cipher text  Encryption algorithm 
 Cipher text chosen by attacker 
together with corresponding 
plaintext generated by secret key 
Chosen Text  Encryption algorithm 
 Plaintext chosen by attacker 
together with corresponding cipher 
text generated by secret key 
 Cipher text chosen by attacker 
together with corresponding 
plaintext generated by secret key 
Table 7. Different types of attack on the encrypted message 
 
In case of a cipher text only attack, one possible approach Eve can use is to 
check all possible combinations (brute force attack) of the seed key. In this approach if 
the key space is very large, then this type of approach becomes impractical. In general, 
in cipher text only attacks, the attacker has the least information available as compared 
to other types of attacks listed in Table 7. Known and chosen plaintext attacks are 
crucial in the sense that the attacker has much more information about the plaintext-
cipher text pair to analyze. In cryptography, an encryption scheme is called 
unconditionally secure if the generated cipher text does not contain enough information 
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to uniquely identify the plaintext. An encryption scheme is called computationally 
secure if the cost of breaking the encryption scheme exceeds the value of the 
information or time required to break the encryption scheme exceeds the valuable 
lifetime of the information. 
5.1.1 Cipher text only and Known Plaintext Attack on Single Photon based QKD 
 Single-photon-based Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocol like Bennett-
Brassard protocol [54], which is based on microscopic quantum signal that contains one 
copy of polarized photon, secures against known plaintext and cipher text only attack. 
Actually, a cipher text only attack on the key, for both single-photon and multi-photon-
based approach, does not reveal much information about the key [14]. BB-84 protocol 
is also secured against known-plaintext attack, as discussed in section 1.4.1, because 
with one copy of a polarization state and two measurement bases (rectilinear and 
diagonal), it is not possible for Eve to come to a conclusive result. 
5.1.2 Known and Chosen Plaintext Attack on Multiphoton based QKD 
 In multi-photon based quantum cryptographic approach like Y-00 protocol, is 
susceptible to known and chosen plaintext attack because this type of approach uses 
mesoscopic coherent states of significant energy. In this scenario, photon number 
splitting attack is a very common approach to analyzing multiple photons having the 
same characteristics (phase, polarization, etc.). One of the main purposes of the Y-00 
protocol is to enhance the complexity of the underlying PRNG by randomizing the 
output sequence due to quantum noise. It is worthy enough to consider the known-
plaintext attack scenario in Y-00 protocol to analyze the effect of quantum noise. In 
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section 5.3, bit-flip error due to quantum noise is considered under known plaintext 
attack scenario to evaluate the effect of quantum noise in LFSR. 
5.2 Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) 
 A Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) belongs to the class of sequential shift 
register consisting of combinational logic that enables it to pseudo-randomly iterate 
through a binary sequence [53]. In Fig. 18, a typical 4-bit LFSR is shown. In Fig. 18, 1, 
2, 3, 4 denotes the chain of registers, and ⊕ represents exclusive-or operation. The 
“Feedback” term comes from the fact that output of exclusive-or operation between 
register 3 and register 4 are fed back to register 1. Due to this feedback, LFSR generates 
a certain length of output sequences of pseudo-random value before it repeats. The 
“Linear” term arises as the exclusive-or operation is a linear operation. Linear Feedback 
Shift Register is also known as Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG), and the 
term “Pseudo” derives from the fact that after each N elements the output sequence 
repeats itself, unlike True Random Number Generator (TRNG).  
 
Fig. 18. A 4-bit Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) 
 
In LFSR, the selection of points (taps) between the registers plays an important 
role in generating maximum length output sequence. For example, the taping between 
register 3 and 4 as shown in Fig. 18 generates maximum length (24 − 1 = 15 bits) 
output sequences before it repeats while taping between register 2 and 4, generates 
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output sequence of only 6 bits long. So, for generating maximum length output 
sequence by LFSR, the choice of taps is very important.  
 In general, a typical maximum-length LFSR will generate a pseudo-random 
sequence of length 2𝑛 − 1, where n is the number of stages. There can be different 
combinations of selection of points (taps) to generate a maximum-length output 
sequence. The output sequence of the LFSR depends on the feedback polynomial, seed 
value, and the tap positions. A primitive polynomial mod 2 [5] is generally used as a 
feedback polynomial in LFSR, and the tap sequences usually describe the exponent in 
the polynomial. For example, a 4-bit LFSR with tap positions at 3rd and 4th bits (Fig. 
18), the primitive polynomial mod 2 becomes, 
 x4 + 𝑥3 + 1. 
(5.1) 
An output sequence of 4-bit LFSR with tap position at 3-th and 4-th bits positions (Fig. 
18) is shown in Table 8. 
 Register States  
Sequence 
Number 





1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 0 1 1 1 1 
3 0 0 1 1 1 
4 0 0 0 1 1 
5 1 0 0 0 0 
6 0 1 0 0 0 
7 0 0 1 0 0 
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8 1 0 0 0 1 
9 1 1 0 0 0 
10 0 1 1 0 0 
11 1 0 1 1 1 
12 0 1 0 1 1 
13 1 0 1 0 0 
14 1 1 0 1 1 
15 1 1 1 0 0 
16 1 1 1 1 1 
Table 8. A typical output sequence of 4-bit LFSR 
 
5.3 Bit-flip Error Analysis in LFSR 
 In this section, we are going to analyze the impact of bit-flip error in the output 
sequence of LFSR for the prediction of the correct seed key under the condition of 
known-plaintext attack. In Y-00 protocol, Eve always introduces error while measuring 
the output sequence of the LFSR due to the quantum noise. This section focuses on the 
optimal number of required bit-flip error to make the seed key unpredictable from the 
erroneous observation of the output sequence. As discussed in chapter 4, using ML-
POVM technique, we are going to estimate the number of non-orthogonal coherent 
states and mean photon number to set the probability of measurement error for Eve in a 
particular range so that from the erroneous observation of the long-running key, it is not 
possible for Eve to predict the seed key by brute-force attack. For bit-flip error analysis 
in LFSR, we are going to use a TRUE-KEY selection procedure as described in Table 
9.  
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TRUE-KEY selection in LFSR  
Step 1 Select n-bit LFSR 
Step 2 Generate all possible sequences (2𝑛) of 
length 2𝑛 − 1 
Step 3 Select a particular seed key with output 
sequence 
Step 4 Get the erroneous sequence with random 
bit-flip error of length 2𝑛 − 1 
Step 5 Compare all possible output sequences 
2𝑛 − 1 with erroneous sequence to get the 
least number of bit-flip and estimated 
seed key 
Step 6 If the estimated seed key in step 5 = seed 
key in step 3: 
Then, 
set TRUE-KEY = 1 
Else, 
Set TRUE-KEY = 0 
Table 9. TRUE-KEY selection procedure in LFSR 
 
Using TRUE-KEY selection procedure in LFSR, we have analyzed effective bit-
flip error required in the output sequence of the 4-bit, 8-bit, and 16-bit LFSR 
respectively, as described in Figs. 19, 20 and 21, to make the seed-key unpredictable by 
brute-force attack.  
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Fig. 19. TURE-KEY selection in 4-bit LFSR 
 






















































Fig. 21. TRUE-KEY selection in 16-bit LFSR 
 
 The feedback polynomials used to implement these three different types of 
maximum-length LFSR are as follows: 
 x4 + 𝑥3 + 1 
𝑥8 + 𝑥6 + 𝑥5 + 𝑥4 + 1 
𝑥16 + 𝑥15 + 𝑥13 + 𝑥4 + 1 
(5.2) 
From the Figs. 19, 20 and 21, one can see that a significant portion of bit-flip 
error is required to make the seed key unpredictable in LFSR by brute-force attack. If 
the length of the input-space of LFSR increases, the number of required bit-flip error 
also increases. For example, in case of 8-bit LFSR (period is 255), more than 100 bit 
flip errors are required to make the seed key unpredictable by brute-force attack 
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whereas for 16-bit LFSR (period is 65535), more than 30100 bit-flip errors are required 
to make the seed key unpredictable. This is due to the co-relation between the output 
and input sequences of the LFSR and the choice of the internal configuration of the 
LFSR. This type of attack is called correlation attack and belongs to the class of known 
plaintext attacks. Stream cipher like LFSR is very susceptible to correlation attack [55, 
56]. If the length of the input space is very large in LFSR, then significantly large 
numbers of bit-flip error are required in the output sequence to make the seed key 
unpredictable by any attacker. 
5.3.1 Success Probability Calculation for Seed Key Estimation in LFSR 
 In cryptography, it is assumed that an attacker has unlimited computational 
power. If an attacker gets hold on the full copy of the output sequence of the LFSR, 
even though it is erroneous output due to measurement error, there has to be significant 
number of errors to prevent the attacker from accurate prediction on the seed key. In 
order to estimate the success probability for estimating the correct seed key for a given 
number of bit-flip error in the output sequence due to measurement error, we have 
proposed success probability as follows: 










In (5.3), 𝐾𝑠 is the running seed key of the LFSR, Ebit−flip is the number of bit-flip errors 
that Eve encountered in the output sequence of the LFSR for a given number of non-
orthogonal coherent states (M) and mean photon number (|𝛼|2), CE𝑏𝑖𝑡−𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑝
𝑛  represents 
different possible combination of the bit-flip error in the output sequence of the LFSR. 
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For example if the output sequence, n, is 255 and bit-flip error due to quantum noise, 
Ebit−flip is 4, then CE𝑏𝑖𝑡−𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑝
𝑛  becomes 𝐶4
255. In (5.3), 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 has special meaning. 
Rank for a given number of bit-flip error is calculated by considering the fact that there 
is a minimum number of bit-flip required in the correct output sequence to get the same 
erroneous output sequence. For example, the output sequence is 255 bit long and there 
is 4-bit flip error in the output sequence, and if the output sequence for seed key-2 (seed 
key number) needs minimum number of bit-flip to get the same erroneous output, then 
the rank for the seed key-2 will be 1. Similarly for other seed keys, the corresponding 
ranking 1, 2, 3 etc. are calculated to get the same erroneous output sequence. Due to the 
correlation between the input and output sequence in the LFSR, it is very much obvious 
that there is always a high possibility to get more than one seed key which belong to 
same rank. Now, 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 is calculated in slightly different way. For example in 
8-bit LFSR, effective operating seed key is key-2 and Eve retrieves the output sequence 
with 105-bit-flip errors. The calculated rank for seed key-2 is 2, then all other seed keys 
having rank up to 2 belong to 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒. In this scenario, if seed key-4, 5, and 6 
have rank 1, 1 and 2 respectively and actual seed key-2 is of rank 2 then value of 
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒. becomes 4. Using these considerations, the success probability 
p[Ks|Ebit−flip(M, |𝛼|
2)]for correctly estimating operating seed key is calculated for 4-
bit, 8-bit LFSR respectively and is shown in Figs. 22 and 23. From Figs. 22 and 23, it is 
worth mentioning that, if the length of the input space is in increasing order, it needs 
higher number of bit-flip errors in the output sequence to reduce the success probability 
of correctly estimating the seed key by any eavesdropper.  
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Fig. 22. Success probability for estimating seed key in 4-bit LFSR 
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5.4 Bit-flip Error Analysis in NLFSR 
 In this section, we will consider Non-Linear Feedback Shift Register (NLFSR) 
as a PRNG. In paper [57], Y-00 protocol is realized by implementation of NLFSR. 
Generally, Non-LFSR is a generalization of LFSR, where present state of the register is 
an output of the non-linear combination of the previous state [58]. In Fig. 24 a typical 
set-up for maximal-length 4-bit NLFSR is shown. In this figure, both “AND” and 
“EXCLUSIVE-OR” operations are utilized to generate nonlinearity in the output 
sequence [59].  
 
Fig. 24. A typical maximal-length 4-bit NLFSR 
 
 Now, using the same procedure as discussed in section 5.3.1, we have calculated 
success probability of predicting seed key for a given number of bit-flip error in the 
output sequence of the NLFSR. The calculated success probabilities for 4-bit and 8-bit 
NLFSR are shown in Figs. 25 and 26, respectively. The feedback polynomial used in 
NLFSR is: 
 x4 + 𝑥3 + 𝑥2 + 𝑥3. 𝑥2 + 1 
𝑥8 + 𝑥5 + 𝑥4 + 𝑥7. 𝑥4. 𝑥3 + 1 
(5.4) 
From Figs. 25 and 26, it is clear that if Eve gets hold on the full copy of output 
sequence, whether it is from LFSR or NLFSR, there should be significant number of 
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bit-flip error to prevent correlation attack. So far, in terms of maximal-length NLFSR 
implementation, number of bit length in input sequence is limited to only 𝑛 ≤ 25 [60].  
 
Fig. 25. Success probability for estimating seed key in 4-bit-NLFSR 
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5.5 Summary 
 In this chapter, we have started our discussion on two prominent cryptographic 
attacks, namely as known plaintext and cipher text attack. Known plaintext attack is 
particularly important for multiphoton-based cryptographic approach because there is 
always a probability for Eve to get additional copy of the quantum state to measure it. 
Then, we discuss on the working principle of the LFSR as a PRNG. Next, bit-flip error 
analysis is carried out on 4-bit, 8-bit and 16-bit LFSR to evaluate the effect of the 
erroneous output on predicting the correct seed key of the LFSR. It has been proven 
that, the tap positions, feedback polynomial, Boolean operations, choice of underlying 
structure in the LFSR play important role to minimize the correlation between input and 
output sequences. After that, an equation of success probability of estimating the seed 
key for a given number of bit-flip error due to number of non-orthogonal coherent states 
and mean photon number is given. It has been shown that, if the input space of the 
LFSR is large enough then subsequently large number of bit-flip error is required to 
prevent known plaintext attack by Eve. Finally, a similar bit-flip error analysis is 
conducted on 4-bit and 8-bit NLFSR respectively, which also shows strong correlation 
between the input and output sequence. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion and Future Work 
This chapter begins with the conclusion of this research work. As Y-00 protocol 
is a multiphoton-based quantum cryptographic approach, it has practical implications to 
be implemented with the existing optical fiber technology. Currently, several initiatives 
for the implementation of Y-00 protocol are ongoing [31]. Finally, this chapter presents 
few specific working scopes, which can be carried out in future. 
6.1 Conclusion 
Y-00 utilizes a shared secret key to determine quantum signal set for individual 
information sequence. Also quantum noise plays a major role in enhancing the 
complexity and security of classical cipher according to quantum measurement, 
estimation and detection theory. In Y-00, there is theoretical constraint to exceeding the 
Shannon limit in cryptography, and there is a certain bound on device limitation to 
provide security against known plaintext attacks. From the presented results, it has been 
proven that for non-orthogonal coherent state detection, ML-POVM provides better 
success probability for coherent-state discrimination than do other measurement 
techniques such as greedy scheme, quantum unambiguous measurement, random 
guessing, etc. In Y-00 implementation schemes, Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) 
is used as a PRNG to generate long-running keys. Due to the correlation between input 
and output sequence of LFSR, the choice of feedback function, underlying algorithm, 
and length of the input seed key play important role in preventing correlation attack by 
an eavesdropper. As in quantum cryptography, it is a universal concept that an 
eavesdropper always poses unbounded computational power. If Eve by any means, gets 
a hold on the whole output sequence of the LFSR by known-plaintext attack, then a 
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significant proportion of bit-flip error is required in the output sequence to prevent Eve 
from correctly estimating seed key. Moreover, Non-LFSR, which is a generalization of 
LFSR, shows almost the same degree of correlation between input and output sequences 
like LFSR. 
6.2 Future Work 
 This research work is the first time that recently formulated maximum-
likelihood POVM technique to measure the phase randomized polarization of the non-
orthogonal coherent states have been introduced. Besides, there are still a few more 
particular working scopes available regarding the performance evaluation of Y-00 
protocol. 
6.2.1 Practical Implementation of ML-POVM technique in Y-00 scheme 
 The immediate working scope could be practical implementation of ML-POVM 
measurement technique into Y-00 scheme. To restrict Eve’s performance, the number 
of coherent states and mean photon number are two important factors in the ML-POVM 
measurement technique. Moreover, the speed and memory required to map the running 
key sequence to a coherent basis selection are also necessary to evaluate 
synchronization between two legitimate users. 
6.2.2 Detailed Proof of Working Methodology of Y-00 Scheme 
 To date, Y-00 protocol suffers from rigorous proof of showing how it exceeds 
the Shannon limit in cryptography. Though, the necessary condition (Equation 3.2) to 
exceed the Shannon limit is well established [22], the sufficient condition (Equation 
3.3) is suffering from rigorous proof. The working principle of Y-00 protocol is based 
on the fact that the inherent quantum uncertainty will increase the overall complexity of 
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the LFSR by exceeding Shannon limit, the theoretical and practical proof of this 
sufficient condition could be an important future working scope in Y-00 protocol. 
6.2.3 Implementation of Machine Learning Approach in Y-00 Scheme 
 Machine learning is all about creating an effective algorithms and methods so 
that a system can learn from the intercepted data, analyze the data, and be able to 
predict the future based on perceived knowledge. Though, implementation of machine 
learning concepts in the quantum world is new, this approach can be implemented in Y-
00 protocol, especially to analyze Eve’s performance on the intercepted data. For 
example, using the ML-POVM measurement technique, for a given number of non-
orthogonal coherent states and mean photon numbers, the failure probability of coherent 
state detection for Eve can be calculated. Now, if Eve introduces bit-flip error in the 
output sequence of the LFSR during the failure events of correctly identifying the 
coherent states, she can calculate a particular rank for different seed keys as described in 
section 5.3.1.  
In Fig. 27 shows histograms of different ranks of randomly chosen running seed 
key-2 (seed key number): 110 bit-flip error (Fig. 27(a)) and 120 bit-flip error (Fig. 
27(b)) in the output sequence of 8-bit LFSR. Similarly, Fig. 28 shows histograms of 
different ranks of another randomly chosen running seed key-30 in 8-bit LFSR. In order 
to calculate rankings for both randomly chosen seed keys, 255 different random 
combinations of 110 and 120 bit-flip errors in the output sequence (255-bit sequence) 
are considered out of 𝐶110
255 and 𝐶120
255 different possible combinations, respectively. From 
Figs. 27 and 28, it is clear that if the number of bit-flip errors are increased in the output 
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sequence of the LFSR, corresponding rankings of the running seed key are also 
increased. 
 
Fig. 27. Histogram of different rank of seed key-2 for 110 bit-flip error (a) and 120 
bit-flip error (b) in the output sequence of 8-bit LFSR 
 
 
Fig. 28. Histogram of different rank of seed key-30 for 110 bit-flip error (a) and 
120 bit-flip error (b) in the output sequence of 8-bit LFSR 
   
 From these observations, Eve can train any suitable classifier of machine 
learning algorithm to predict the input of the LFSR and in this scenario, Naïve Bayes 
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classifier [61] could be one of the best candidates to predict the running seed key. Fig. 
29 shows a typical workflow of machine learning. 
 
Fig. 29. A typical workflow of machine learning   
 
 Moreover, one of the main advantages of using a machine learning algorithm in 
predicting seed key of the LFSR from the observation of the output sequence is that 
there is no definite need to measure the whole output sequence of the LFSR because 
Eve can train her classifier based on her measured observation of any length, even 
though more data on the measured observation of the output sequence will help the 
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